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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
JUST AND REASONABLE COMPENSATION
I. IRoDucrIoN
It is the purpose of this Comment to explore what sums have represented, to
appellate courts, "just and reasonable compensation" in certain personal injury
areas; how the courts have arrived at these sums; and particularly Missouri's posi-
tion in comparison with that of other jurisdictions.'
The reader will find herein a chart containing a synopsis of cases involving
the loss of legs, arms and fingers in the last ten years together with a few earlier
cases. It is suggested that an examination of this chart will enable the reader to
more easily distinguish and compare the cases in the field.
In determining what constitutes "just and reasonable compensation," many
factors are taken into consideration. One Illinois appellate court stated that con-
sideration must be made of plaintiff's "wages at the time of the accident and his
probable earnings during his expectancy; of the pain and suffering he has under-
gone and will undergo; of the deprivation of the privileges and enjoyments com-
mon to men in like circumstances, ... and his medical expenses and the probable
expenses of attending him in the future."2
These, among others, are the items that this Comment will use for compar-
ing the cases. It will also examine the amounts ordered- remitted by the trial and
appellate courts and the reasons therefor.
I . II. Loss OF BOTH LEGS AND AN ARM
IDAHo-FFDERAL.-In Union Pac. R.R. v. Jok nson,3 1957, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a jury verdict of $225,000 for twenty-three
year old LaVerl Johnson's loss of both legs below the knee and his right arm near
the shoulder. He had a life expectancy of forty years and was earning $300 per
month. The court stated that, "We do not mean by dicta to resolve other cases,
but it is reasonable to say the case would have been different if Johnson had been
older and his life's pattern had become set." 4
ILLINOIS.-In Goertz v. Chicago & N. Ry.,5 1958, the Appellate Court of Illinois
for the First District allowed a recovery of $200,000 for sixty-two year old dress
cutter Edward Goertz's loss of both legs ten inches below the groin and his left arm
nine inches above the elbow. Plaintiff had a life expectancy of twelve years and his
pecuniary loss was $69,978.03. He wore an artificial arm, but did not now wear
artificial legs due to the pain they produced. In finding the jury verdict of $300,000
1. See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 3 (1951) for cases in the area but not
covered in this Comment. For unreported cases in this area the reader is referred
to "Awards Over $50,000, Unreported Cases" appearing in each volume of the
NACCA L.J.
2. Smith v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 343 Ill. App. 593, 612, 99 N.E.2d 717, 726
(1st Dist. 1951).
3. 249 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1957), Note, 21 NACCA L.J. 269 (1958).
4. Id. at 679.
5. 19 Ill. App. 2d 261, 153 N.E.2d 486 (1st Dist. 1958).
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grossly excessive, the court stated, "Taking all the imponderable elements which
might have been considered by the jury, and giving the plaintiff the benefit of all
doubt, we do not feel that the evidence warrants a judgment of a sum greater
than $200,000."6 The concurring opinion, per Kiley, J., pointed out that the average
allowance for pain and suffering in relevant Illinois cases was about forty per cent,
while in this case it was over seventy per cent.
The age of these two plaintiffs differed by thirty-nine years; their life expectancy
by twenty-eight years. Goertz would be able to use artificial limbs; Johnson was
using them at his trial. The injuries were substantially the same; the difference in
the awards sustained was $25,000 more to the man who was thirty-nine years
younger. Yet, each court felt that the award granted was the maximum, or nearly
the maximum, award which it could sustain.7 It would appear that if the Johnson
case had been in Illinois an award of over $225,000 might well have been sustained
in his favor.8
III. Loss OF BOT LEGS
Since 1944 there have been fourteen reported cases in which the plaintiff lost
both legs. In ten of these cases he was able to use artificial limbs. Because of the
difference in degree of disability and possibility of rehabilitation attendant upon
the ability to use prostheses, these ten cases will be discussed separately.
A. Plaintiff Could Use Prostheses
CALIFORNIA.-In McNulty v. Southern Pac.,9 1950, the California District Court
of Appeals for the First District upheld a $100,000 award for the loss of Thomas
McNulty's left leg three inches below the knee and his right leg three inches above
the knee.1° Plaintiff had been assistant cashier with the American Trust Co. 1 at
$365 per month, was forty-two years old and had a life expectancy of twenty-six
years. Even though there were many factors which would tend to reduce the ver-
dict, including the fact that his employer paid him throughout his absence, the
court recognized that "the fact remains that respondent, in the very prime of life,
must carry on for the remainder of it with this serious handicap,' 2 that he would
6. Id. at 274, 153 N.E.2d at 493.
7. In Union Pac. KR. v. Johnson, the court was of the opinion "that the
verdict almost reaches the area of too much, but we believe it is one which it is
our duty to let stand." 249 F.2d at 679. In the Goertz case the court reduced the
verdict to $200,000 finding that to be the largest amount which could be sustained.
8. See note 16 infra.
9. 96 Cal. App. 2d 841, 216 P.2d 534 (1st Dist. 1950).
10. "Respondent's right leg was cut off by the wheels of the train, and he
testified that at the time, as he lay helpless on his back, he knew this. . . .His
left leg was badly mangled but not severed, and at the hospital it had to be ampu-
tated three inches below the knee. In the same operation the amputation of the
right leg was completed three inches above the knee." Id. at 846, 216 P.2d at 538.
11. Plaintiff had recently taken a special training course which would enhance
his position.
12. 96 Cal. App. 2d at 848, 216 P.2d at 539.
19601
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never have the freedom of movement of the ordinary person and that this might
not only retard his advancement but cause the loss of his present position."
ILLINOiS.-In Avance v. Thompson, 4 1943, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
Fourth District upheld a recovery of $100,000 for thirty-three year old brakeman
Harry Avance's loss of his right leg three inches above the knee and his left leg
four inches below the knee. His life expectancy was 40.17 years. A jury award of
$125,000 was cut to $100,000 by remittitur in the trial court. In upholding this
sum the court stated:
Nor can we in a personal injury case, reduce the amount of the verdict
to a matter of mathematical computation....
It is difficult to appraise scientifically human pain and suffering and a
mutilated body .... (U]nless we are able to say that the verdict is so ex-
cessive as to indicate that the jury was moved by prejudice or passion, we
would not be warranted in reversing the judgment on the ground that the
verdict is excessive.15
In Smith v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,16 1951, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
First District upheld a recovery of $185,000 for twenty-one year old Marion Smith's
loss of both legs at mid-thigh.17 He had a life expectancy of forty-five years and an
average annual wage of $2,860. In upholding the jury's award the court set out
the "reasonable men" test of excessiveness of the verdict:
The question is whether reasonable men might differ in their answers to
the question. We cannot say that reasonable men would not differ on the
question whether $185,000 was too great an amount to allow plaintiff who
was so badly injured. ...is
The court distinguished the Avance case, by implication, in stating: "We need not
cite authority for the statement that we must consider the fact that this verdict
reflects an inflationary period in our economy."' "
NEw JERsE.-In Greenburg v. Garfield-Passaic Bits Co.,20 1946, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey upheld a total recovery of $85,0002± for the loss of both legs below the
knees by a fifty-five year old woman with a life expectancy of 17.4 years. The court
stated that:
13. However, it is pointed out in 3 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 2475 (1954) that
the plaintiff was earning more after the accident than before.
14. 320 Ill. App. 406, 51 N.E.2d 334 (4th Dist. 1943).
15. Id. at 419, 421, 51 N.E.2d at 341.
16. 343 Ill. App. 593, 99 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist. 1951). In Goertz v. Chicago
& Northwestern Ry., supra note 5, at 275, 153 N.E.2d at 493, Kiley, J., specially
concurring, stated that "it seems unlikely that this court would disturb, as exces-
sive, in 1958 a verdict for $300,000 in a case on all fours with the Smith case."
17. He also suffered a comminuted fracture of the breast bone and a straighten-
ing of the spine.
18. 343 INI. App. at 612, 99 N.E.2d at 726.
19. Ibid.
20. 134 N.J.L. 371, 48 A.2d 389 (1946).
21. The jury allowed Mrs. Greenburg $50,000 for her injuries and Mr. Green-
burg $35,000 for the damage sustained by him by reason of his wife's injury.
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The verdict in favor of Mrs. Greenburg of $50,000 as compensation
for the pain and suffering which she has and will suffer as a result of the
accident seems to us not to be excessive. Before the accident, it appears
that she was an active woman. Assuming that artificial limbs may be
secured, it seems unlikely that her household duties may be easily per-
formed without constant help. (Emphasis added.) 22
NEW YORK-FEDRAL.-In McKinney v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R.R., 23 1944, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York allowed a recovery of
$100,000 for forty-three year old railroad employee James McKinney's loss of both
legs midway between the knee and ankle. His total pecuniary damage was $60,000.
In reducing the jury verdict of $130,000, Judge Goddard pointed out that all above
$60,000 was to compensate him for pain and suffering, humiliation and disfigure-
ment and that: "[Tlhere must be some uniformity in verdicts for these elements
of damage.'" 24
In Hubbard v. Long Island R.R.,2 5 1957, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York upheld an award of $226,000 for twenty-three
year old brakeman Ronald Hubbard's loss of both legs below the knees. His life
expectancy was 45.61 years; medical expenses were in excess of $11,000; and his
average annual wage was $5,500. The court, in replying to defendant's contention
that the verdict was excessive because plaintiff could be rehabilitated, evinced a
different attitude, than that taken in 1944 by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, in the McKinney case, by asserting that it
appeared that 'the jurors believed plaintiff could earn little, if anything. "Even if
I entertained a different view, I could not with propriety substitute my judgment
for theirs, since I do not believe that the verdict was so flagrantly excessive as to
offend my sense of judgment"26
OHIo.-In Beam v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,27 1945, the Ohio Court of Appeals upheld
a recovery of $75,000 for a brakeman's loss of both legs about seven inches below
the knee. His monthly income was $280. In upholding the jury's verdict, the court
stated:
The verdict, while large, is such that we are unable to say it is ex-
cessive, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the injuries,
their permanency, and the disabling character thereof.
There appears to us to be nothing in this record upon which a claim
of passion and prejudice would be predicated.2 8
In Bartlebaugk v. Pennsylvania R.R., 29 1948, the Ohio Court of Appeals up-
held a recovery of $225,000 for twenty-three year old brakeman Edward Bartle-
22. 134 N.J.L. at 372, 48 A.2d at 390.
23. 57 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
24. Id. at 813.
25. 152 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
26. Id. at 2.
27. 77 Ohio App. 419, 68 N.E.2d 159 (1945).
28. Id. at 433, 68 N.E.2d at 166.
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baugh's loss of one leg four inches below the hip, and the other eight inches below
the hip. Further surgical treatment was necessary before he could use artificial
limbs.8 0 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio the judgment was reduced to
$150,000 on the purported ground that "the erroneous introduction of evidence
relative to refund annuities . . . injected into the case an improper standard, and
apparently influenced the jury to award an excessive sum for the loss of future
earnings. '81 However, the majority opinion also stated:
Reducing this judgment to $150,000 would leave $92,383 for claimed
damages other than loss of earnings. An amount beyond this we consider
excessive.32
SOUTH CAROLIMNA-FE ERAL.-In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Robertson,85 1954, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld a recovery of $80,000
for railroad employee H. L. Robertson's loss of both legs below the knees.8'
TExxs.-In Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Crown,35 1949, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
allowed a recovery of $12,500 for twenty-two year old Pete Crown's loss of one leg
four inches below the knee, the other seven and one-half inches below the knee.
In reducing the jury award of $50,000, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals pointed out
that he suffered a minimum amount for such an injury, returned to work within a
year after his injury and was earning twice as much as he had before the injury 80
It was also stated that "under the verdict, we cannot consider suffering or any
other thing that may occur after the trial as affecting the question of excessiveness
of the verdict, except subsequent loss of earning capacity, if any."37
SuMMATIoN.-As the chart indicates the highest award for this period was $226,000
affirmed by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
in 1957 while the lowest was $12,500 affirmed-by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
In contrast to the Ohio Court of Appeals attitude in the Bartlebaugh case that:
There is no fixed standard by which to measure the damages for pain
and suffering, mental anguish or shock to the nervous system or humilia-
tion. Such matters rest in the sound judgment of the jury. The Court gave
30. Two to three operations would be required.
31. 150 Ohio St. at 391, 82 N.E.2d at 855.
32. Id. at 390, 82 N.E.2d at 855.
33. 214 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1954).
34. No further facts were reported.
35. 220 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
36. "He [plaintiff] testified that he had become skilled in making artificial
limbs; that he has no trouble getting employment of that kind and that he is
being paid $1.25 per hour for that kind of work. He testified that carpenters are
paid 50c to 75c per hour more than men are paid for making artificial'limbs.
Plantiff testified that before his injury he had been working as a carpenter for his
father . .. that his father paid him 50c per hour and room and board; that he
'imagined' he was making $1,000 to $1,500 per year. He testified: 'Q. Then you
are making twice as much money as you made back before this accident, aren't you?
A. Yes, sir.'" Id. at 300.
37. 220 S.W.2d at 300.
[Vol. 25
5
Riner: Riner: Just and Reasonable Compensation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1960
COMMENTS
complete and proper instructions to the jury on all these elements of
damages. It must be presumed that the jury followed the instructions of the
Court.38
the Supreme Court of Ohio felt that there should be some uniformity for these
non-pecuniary elements of damage. Surely both views cannot be harmonious. Either
the jury will have to decide it, or, if uniformity is desired, a scale of monetary ret-
ribution for pain, suffering, mental anguish and humiliation should be set up
similar to the compensation scale used in Workmen's Compensation Laws.3 9
REASONS FOR RmvrmmLTu-In the McKinney case the United States District Court
based its reduction upon undue influence on the jury by the plaintiff.40 This, of
course, is always a good ground for reversal or the ordering of a remittitur. In the
Bartlebaugk case41 a remittitur was ordered by the Supreme Court of Ohio primarily
upon the ground of an erroneous introduction of evidence at the trial with a per-
haps implied holding that more than $92,383 for damages other than loss of earn-
ings was excessive. The Texas court ordered a remittitur in- the Crown case4 2 be-
cause nothing after the trial but loss of earnings could be considered and the plain-
tiff was earning more after his injury than before.
These remittiturs easily lend themselves to the view that while the plaintiff
may recover for all of his pecuniary damages, his recovery for non-pecuniary losses
will, in some way, be limited. Perhaps it is limited by some hope for uniformity
which Judge Goddard stated must exist.4 3 If absolute uniformity is required, e.g.,
$8,000 per injury, then nothing is taken from those who suffer a minimum and no
more is given to those who suffer a great deal. If it is to be percentage uniformity,
i.e., non-pecuniary damages recovered may not exceed a certain percentage of the
total verdict, 4 then the plaintiff who was employed at low wages would receive
less than a highly paid plaintiff for non-pecuniary damages though both suffered
precisely the same injury.
If either of these standards are invoked, they necessarily deprive the plaintiff
of fair and reasonable compensation for his injury, or cost the defendant more, be-
cause the award is not based upon the injury and its attendant losses, but upon
some scheme of enforced uniformity devised by the appellate tribunal. It should
be kept in mind that a uniformity of awards for the loss of both legs does not
38. 78 N.E.2d at 415.
39. See the opinions of Latimer, J., and Wolfe, J, in Bennett v. Denver &
R. G. W. R.R., 117 Utah 57, 213 P.2d 325 (1950) for an excellent discussion of the
amount of personal injury awards in relation to the amount of compensation re-
coverable under the state's workmen's compensation laws for similar injuries.
40. "I think that the members of the jury were unduly affected by sympathy.
McKinney had a particularly winning and attractive personality and as he crept
on his knees past the jury box to the witness stand and climbed upon the witness
stand, he was quite an appealing sight." 57 F. Supp. at 813.
41. See note 29 supra.
42. See note 35 supra.
43. "There must be some uniformity in verdicts for these elements of damage."
McKinney v. Pittsburg & L.E. R.R., supra note 23, at 813.
44. That was the amount given in the Goertz case.
1960]
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magically equate the pain and suffering of the two plaintiffs, nor guarantee fair and
reasonable compensation to both.
B. Plaintiff Cannot Use Prostheses
NEw YoRK-FEDERaL.-In Delaney v. New York Cent. R.R.,45 1946, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld a verdict of
$165,000 for thirty year old Richard Delaney's loss of both legs four inches below
the buttocks. His medical expenses were not reported, annual earnings approxi.
mated $4,000, and discounted loss of past and future wages was between $104,000
and $114,000. The court, though cognizant of the fact that the verdict was large,40
stated that:
Adding all these items up I can't say that the jury in awarding
$165,000 was so far wrong that passion or prejudice is manifested. It was
a large verdict. However, I have no right to interfere with it unless it is so
excessive as to appear to have been given under the influence of passion
or prejudice.47
NEw YoRK.-In Conkey v. New York Cent. R.R.,48 1954, the Supreme Court of
New York allowed an award of $168,00049 for forty year old brakeman Harold
Conkey's loss of both legs near the pelvis. He had no medical expenses and loss of
earnings totaled $110,000. After discussing several cases, the court reduced a jury
award of $300,000 to $168,000 finding that:
A verdict even of $168,000 is larger than any verdict which has been
permitted to stand in any comparable case which has been cited or which
the Court has been able to find. Any sum in excess of this amount is clearly
excessive. 50
OKLAHOMA.--In Kurn v. Manley,51 1944, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allowed
a recovery of $30,000, plus $700 medical expense for thirty-three year old manual
laborer Buster Manley's loss of both legs shortly below the torso. He had a life
expectancy of thirty-five years, had for about a year earned $1,600 to $1,800 and
was not regularly employed most of the time. The jury gave damages of $50,000
which the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found "substantially excessive" 2 in the
amount in excess of $30,000 plus the $700 medical bill.
MissouRr.-In Counts v. Ttompson,53 1949, the Supreme Court of Missouri allowed
a recovery of $80,000 for thirty-six year old brakeman Pless Counts' loss of both
45. 68 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
46. "When the jury returned a verdict of $165,000 for the plaintiff, my first
impression was that it was a large verdict, but one which the jury might return
and still not be out of line with the evidence in the case." Id. at 72.
47. Id. at 74.
48. 206 Misc. 1077, 136 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
49. The net award. Plaintiff had been found twenty per cent contributorily
negligent.
50. 206 Misc. at 1085, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
51. 194 Okla. 574, 153 P.2d 623 (1944).
52. Id. at 578, 153 P.2d at 627.
53. 359 Mo. 485, 222 S.W.2d 487 (1949).
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legs below the upper two-thirds of his thigh. His average monthly wage was $228
and would increase with length of service. There were spurs on the stumps of his
legs, which would have to be surgically removed before he could use artificial limbs,
and there was evidence that due to the permanent weakening of his upper torso he
would never be able to use artificial limbs. He had an attendant during a part of
each week and could not be trained for clerical work because he was of below aver-
age mentality. The jury's verdict of $165,000 was reduced to $140,000 by the trial
court. The Supreme Court of Missouri reduced the award to $80,000 stating:
We do not find that a judgment for personal injuries has ever been
permitted to stand in this state for more than $50,000. (Emphasis added.) "
In Moore v. Ready-Mixed Concrete Co.,55 1959, the Supreme Court of Missouri
upheld a recovery of $150,000 for policeman Robert Moore's loss of his right leg
at the knee, stiff left leg, multiple fractures and lacerations, concussion and severe
brain injury."6 He underwent a total of twenty-one operations under general
anesthetic and received narcotics until he became an addict, but was cured of this
before his release from the hospital.57 From June 1956 until the spring of 1957
he was in a cast from the waist down, one doctor being of the opinion "that it
would have been better to have amputated plaintiff's left leg but the only place
that it could have been done was at the hip and that is a very unsatisfactory joint
for fitting an artificial limb" 58 At the trial pus drained from both legs, the right
hip joint was severely impaired, the left hip frozen and he was suffering "phantom
pains."" His medical expenses to March 1, 1958 were $19,820.86, and his loss of
earnings to time of trial was $12,656. A jury verdict of $200,000 rendered in the
Jackson County Circuit Court was reduced to $150,000 by Circuit Judge Terte.
This was upheld by the Supreme Court of Missouri.
The Supreme Court pointed out that at the time of trial he was thirty-four years
old, had a life expectancy of 34.29 years, was previously in excellent health, had
been in line for promotion and was now "permanently and totally disabled, from a
physical standpoint"6 0
In reply to defendant's contention that the verdict was so grossly excessive as
to show bias and prejudice on the part of the jury, the court stated that "while
trial courts may infer bias and prejudice from the size of the verdict alone since
they weigh the evidence, appellate courts, as a matter of policy, ordinarily will not
do so but"8 ' will only look at the record to see if the trial court abused its discre-
tion.
54. Id. at 504, 222 S.W.2d at 496.
55. 329 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1959) (en banc).
56. See id. at 28-29 for a detailed list of plaintiff's injuries.
57. "Plaintiff cannot be given any narcotics in the future without danger of
immediate addiction." Id. at 29.
58. Id. at 29.
59. Pains which seem to come from the amputated limb.
60. 329 S.W.2d at 30.
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In reply to the contention that the verdict was excessive, the court compared
this case to the Counts caseG2 saying:
When all of the foregoing factors and distinctions are considered we do
not believe that the instant judgment of $150,000 is 'out of line' in com-
parison with the $80,000 judgment approved in the Counts case.03
The attitude of the Supreme Court of Missouri in this opinion is markedly dif-
ferent from that taken in its earlier opinions in this field. The emphasis here
seemed to be more heavily upon the injuries sustained than upon prior approved
awards. This is also in strong contrast to the view of the New York court in the
Conkey case.6 4 The monetary award in this case is still lower than either of the
New York cases in this area. Whether the court would have affirmed a larger award
we cannot know. It is to be hoped, however, that the court never again feels that it
is "hamstrung," by not having precedent upon which to rely in affirming a rea-
sonable award, as it did in the Counts case.
REAsONS FOR REMITTITUR.-The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the K'urn case
ordered a remittitur because, in the language of the court:
Viewing the amount of the verdict, the instruction as to detailed allega-
tions of plaintiff's petition, the issues submitted, and the physical facts
and evidence of plaintiff's actions, there is strong showing that the verdict
was unduly influenced by bias, passion or prejudice65
The Supreme Court of New York in the Conkey case based its order of remittitur
upon the fact that since this was the largest verdict ever permitted any larger sum
would be "clearly excessive." It is doubtful that this is a valid reason. The court
is in actuality saying that if no other court has given the plaintiff his due, neither
shall we. The Supreme Court of Missouri in the Counts case seemed to be also
deeply enmeshed in the ties of precedent, which is evidenced by the court's refusal
to allow a larger award, based largely upon the ground that no judgment for such
injuries for more than $50,000 had previously been permitted.
MIssouRI's COMPARATIVE PosrnoN.-The jury verdicts in the Counts case and the
Delaney case were identical-$165,000." The 'remittiturs ordered by the Missouri
courts left the Counts award at less than half of what had been awarded three years
earlier in the Delaney case and what the jury had awarded. Delaney's annual wage
was $4,000 while Counts' was $3,000 per year. Delaney's life expectancy was longer
than Counts'. Yet, it is doubtful that these factors, though weighty, alone would
account for the difference in the permitted awards. It is more probable that the
key to the discrepancy lies in the fact that the Missouri Supreme Court felt bound
to precedent by the tie of uniformity, uniformity here meaning absolute uniformity
of total awards. So long as an attitude such as this prevails it is bound to result
62. See note 53 supra.
63. 329 S.W.2d at 31. This case is included here, in the "Loss of Both Legs"
section, even though Moore only lost one leg, because of this comparison.
64. See note 50 supra.
65. 194 Okla. at 578, 153 P.2d at 627.
66. See "jury award" on the enclosed chart.
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in the plaintiff not receiving just and reasonable compensation, much less attaining
the "adequate award."
67
In the Moore case, Commissioner Holman, for the court, quoted the following
passage from Jones v. Pennsylvania R.R.: 6s
All courts hold the recovery is measured by that which is 'fair and rea-
sonable compensation'. . . . Fair and reasonable compensation in each case
must rest upon the foundation of the facts of the case. Yet some considera-
tion must be given to the amounts of award which have been held to be
fair and reasonable compensation where plaintiffs have suffered similar in-
juries. There should be reasonable uniformity as to the amounts of ver-
dicts.6 9
The court here may have had in mind the type of uniformity that is desirable:
when two injuries are precisely alike in all aspects, then the awards should be uni-
form, but for every factual deviation a change in the award should be considered.
The Supreme Court of Missouri further stated, in reference to earlier cases, that
it did "not find those cases persuasive." 70 The Moore case may be a step forward
for the Missouri court in the direction of granting the plaintiff fair and reasonable
compensation regardless of whether those plaintiffs who proceeded him received it
or not.7 3 Only further decisions can tell if this is a stepping stone to reasonableness
or just an exceptional case.
IV. Loss OF ONE LEG
A. Without Other Serious Injury
CALIFORNI-FEDERAL -In Southern Pac. v. Gut hie,72 1949, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a recovery of $100,000 for fifty-eight
year old engineer Garry Guthrie's loss of his right leg between the knee and hip. He
had undergone two operations, might never be able to use an artificial limb and
still suffered from pain. The present worth of $6,000 per year (the wage now earned
by one who held the same position as Guthrie) for eleven years (Guthrie would
then be seventy) was found to be $55,515.74. Even though the court felt that the
"verdict is too high,"73 the majority of the court felt that "the amount of this
verdict left it within the area of the trial court's discretion"7 4 and affirmed the
judgment.
On rehearing of the Guthrie case,75 1951, the United States Court of Appeals,
sitting in bank, recalculated the present value of the loss of future earnings and
67. See Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1951).
68. 353 Mo. 163, 175, 182 S.W.2d 157, 161 (1944).
69. 329 S.W.2d at 30-31.
70. Id. at 31.
71. See note 199 infra.
72. 180 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1949), aff'd on rehearing, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir.
1951).
73. Id. at 303.
74. Id. at 306.
75. 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951).
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found that it could exceed $60,000, but was of the opinion that the verdict was
still too high. The judgment was affirmed, however, because, as the court stated:
[W]e cannot here reverse the action of the trial court unless the verdict
can be said to be 'grossly excessive,' or as stated in the Affolder case,
'monstrous.' We think that the verdict in this case cannot be so charac-
terized.76
CALIFORNIA.-In Leming v. Oilields Trucking Co.," 1955, the Supreme Court of
California upheld a recovery of $213,460.22 for forty-seven year old Harvey Lem-
ing's loss of his right leg at the upper third of the femur. His life expectancy was
23.08 years and he claimed pecuniary damages of $175,258.42 plus $38,201.60 for
other damages. This is the largest award granted in this area.
FLORnDA.-In Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.,,s 1955, the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld a total recovery of $193,91179 for eight year old Jimmy Braddock's
loss of his left leg. The trial court ordered a remittitur of $127,780.85 from the
jury's award of $254,939. Reinstating a part of this remittitur because of various
errors by the trial court, 0 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed an award of
$193,911.
ILLINOIS.-In Murphy v. Friel,81 1946, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First
District found an award of
$75,000 to incompetent person who had done only odd jobs for 20
years and whose injured leg could bear no weight and should be amputated
was so excessive as to disclose prejudice, passion or misconduct, requiring
a new trial notwithstanding plaintiff remitted $40,000.82
In Reinmueller v. Chicago Motor Coacl Co.,83 1950, the Appellate Court of
Illinois for the First District upheld a recovery of $45,000 for sixty-eight year old
Kunigunda Reinmueller's loss of her left leg below the knee. She had undergone
three major operations and had been taken to the operating room on eighteen to
twenty other occasions; medical expenses to the time of trial totaled $5,325 and
were continuing at $30 per week. The jury gave an award of $45,000 which the
Appellate Court of Illinois did not find excessive.
MicnIoAN-FEDERAL.-In Pennsylvania R.R. v. Ackerson,84 1950, the United States
76. Id. at 933. This case contains an excellent review of the cases dealing with
the power of courts of appeal to order a remittitur, a power which some courts felt
they possessed and other felt they did not.
77. 44 Cal. 2d 343, 282 P.2d 23 (1955).
78. 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955).
79. $187,411 for James and $6,500 for his father.
80. The court found a mathematical error in the trial court's calculation and
that the trial court erred in reducing the amount given for pain and suffering to
its present worth.
81. 328 Ill. App. 586, 66 N.E.2d 450 (1st Dist. 1946).
82. Id. at headnote 10. An abstract only was published.
83. 341 Ill. App. 178, 93 N.E.2d 120 (1st Dist. 1950).
84. 183 F.2d 662 (6th Cir. 1950).
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Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld a jury award of $25,000 for Cecile
Ackerson's loss of one leg stating that:
In view of the actual hospital and surgical expense incurred, the numerous
operations to which appellee was necessarily subjected by the critical na-
ture of her injuries, the amputation of her leg, and the loss of earning
power, we conclude that the allowance is not so unreasonable as to amount
to an abuse of discretion. 5
NEw YORK-FEDERaL.-In Cereste v. New York, N.H.&H. R.R., s8 1956, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of $125,000
for the loss of Frank Cereste's leg above the knee. No further facts were reported.
OHio-FmEDRA.-In Ringhiser v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R.,s7 1956, the United States
District Court of the Southern District of Ohio overturned a jury award of $40,000
for Boyd Ringhiser's loss of his right leg because of insufficient proof to establish
negligence. The only comment upon damages by the three courts which passed
upon this case88 was the following by the District Court:
The plaintiff had lost five years of income at the time of trial. If
the loss of earnings are considered, there is very little left for pain and
suffering and the loss of the limb with the attendant permanent impair-
ment.8 9
OKLAHOMA.-In Horwitz Iron & Metal Co. v. Myler,90 1952, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma upheld a recovery of $26,000 for Carroll Myler's loss of his left leg
above the knee. Long hospitalization and repeated surgery were required. The court
stated its rule as to excessiveness to be:
In the case of City of Norman v. Lewis, 180 Okl. 344, 69 P.2d 377,
we said:
'In an action for personal injuries, the jury is charged with the duty
of fixing the amount of damages, and its verdict will not be set aside as
excessive unless it clearly appears that the jury committed some gross and
palpable error or acted under some improper bias, influence or prejudice.' 81
PENNSYLvANI-FEDEAL.-In Allen v. Simpson, 2 1951, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania upheld an award of $8,000 for
twenty-three year old waitress Alice Allen's loss of her left leg below the knee.93
Her loss of earnings were $2,553. The court held that "the verdict of the jury is
85. Id. at 667.
86. 231 F.2d 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 951 (1956).
87. 148 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Ohio 1956), aff'd, 241 F.2d 416 (2) (6th Cir.
1956), rev'd and remanded, 354 U.S. 901 (1957).
88. See note 87 snpra.
89. 148 F. Supp. at 536.
90. 207 Okla. 691, 252 P.2d 475 (1952).
91. Id. at 694, 252 P.2d at 478.
92. 95 F. Supp. 535 (M.D. Pa. 1951).
93. Her husband, Merrill Allen, was injured in the same accident and it is
possible that he showed damages for the entire medical expenses.
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not so excessive as to shock the conscience of the Court, nor can it be said to be
the result of bias, prejudice or caprice."'94
In Heckattorne v. Pennsylvania R.R., 95 1957, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania upheld a recovery of $35,000 for Robert
Heckathorne's loss of one leg above the knee. The jury gave judgment for $105,000
but found plaintiff two-thirds contributorily negligent and reduced the verdict to
$35,000. Plaintiff moved the court to enter judgment for $105,000 or order a new
trial. Both motions were denied and the amount of damages was not discussed.
In R-assell v. Monongahela Ry.,96 1958, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania upheld a recovery of $149,3880r for switch-
man James Russell, Jr.'s loss of his left leg below the knee. His life expectancy was
37.6 years and he had an earning capacity in excess of $6,000 per year. The Court
pointed out that, assuming only a 50% disability, plaintiff had lost $112,000 in
future income. In view of this plus the pain and suffering endured by plaintiff, the
court found the verdict of $149,388 was not excessive and did not shock the con-
science of the court.
PENNsYLvANIA.-In Magerko v. West Penn. Rys.,98 1950, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania allowed a recovery of $16,000 for twenty-one month old Anthony
Magerko's loss of his right foot. A jury award of $24,000 was reduced to $18,000 by
the trial court. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further reduced the award to
$16,000 stating that a "strong sympathy moved the jury"00 into granting an ex-
cessive award.
TExAs.-In Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Darton,100 1951, the Civil Appeals Court of
Texas upheld a recovery of $21,236 for nineteen year old laborer Ike Darton's loss
of his right leg above the knee. At the time of the accident he was earning 60c per
hour. The jury verdict for $21,236, "of which $20,000 was for physical pain, mental
anguish and loss of earning capacity,"01~ was held not to be excessive.
WASHINGTON.-In Brown v. Intercoasta Fisheries,02 1949, the Supreme Court of
Washington upheld a recovery of $25,000 for twenty-eight year old seaman Robert
Brown's loss of his left leg above the ankle. He had a life expectancy of thirty-six
years, would need more operations and was gainfully employed although his in-
come had been reduced. The court found that the jury's verdict for $25,000 was
not so "unmistakenly excessive ... as to require a new trial."
103
WEST VIRGIMA.-In Jones v. Ambrose,104 1946, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
94. 95 F. Supp. at 537.
95. 156 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
96. 159 F. Supp. 650 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
97. The jury reduced its verdict for $186,735 to $149,388 by finding plaintiff
was twenty per cent. contributorily negligent.
98. 365 Pa. 609, 76 A.2d 618 (1950).
99. Id. at 613, 76 A.2d at 620.
100. 241 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
101. Id. at 183.
102. 34 Wash. 2d 48, 207 P.2d 1205 (1949).
103. Id. at 54, 207 P.2d at 1208.
104. 128 W. Va. 715, 38 S.E.2d 263 (1946).
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West Virginia upheld a recovery of $20,000 for fourteen year old John Jones' loss
of one leg approximately two-thirds of the way up the thigh, pointing out that:
There is no scale by which damages of this sort can be weighed, and
what seems otherwise to be a just verdict cannot be -nullfied nless the
excess of its amount is plain. (Emphasis added.) 05
MIssouax-FEDERAL.--In Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 1 0 1948, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Missouri allowed an award of
$80,000 for thirty-five year old switchman Floyd Aolder's loss of his right leg four
inches below the hip. He had a life expectancy of over thirty-seven years and his
average monthly wage was $400. He had been in constant pain since the injury;
further operations would be necessary before he could wear an artificial limb and
by reason of the shortness of the stump he might never be able to use an artificial
limb successfully. In reducing the jury verdict for $95,000 to $80,000 the United
States District Court stated that $70,000 for the loss of future earnings would not
be excessive enough to cause the court to overturn the verdict and that he was also
entitled to compensation for pain, suffering, disfigurement, embarrassment and in-
convenience. As to uniformity of verdicts the court stated:
The cases cited by the parties do not help a great deal in deciding the
questions presented. On the other hand we believe there should be some
attempt at uniformity rather than a total disregard of the judgment of
other courts.m 07
The court went on to point out that: "If no Court had approved a verdict of $60,000
for loss of a limb up to 1944, a verdict of $95,000 four years later is excessive." 08
On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit-° stated
that: "The assignment of error that the verdict is excessive is not properly
addressed to this court."" 0 On further appeal the United States Supreme Court
stated that it did "agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of damages
awarded by the District Court's judgment is not monstrous in the circumstances of
this case.""'
As the chart indicates, this is the highest award allowed in a Missouri court'
to this time. Still the award was $15,000 less than what the jury felt would reason-
ably compensate the plaintiff. It is clearly seen from the chart that this award was
higher than awards affirmed to this time, for similar injuries, in the other jurisdic-"
tions.
Mxssoux.-In Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.,U2 1946, the Supreme Court of
Missouri upheld a recovery of $18,000 for three year old Ruth Petty's loss of her
105. Id. at 725, 38 S.E.2d at 268.
106. 79 F. Supp.'365 (E.D. Mo. 1948), rev'd, 174 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1949),
cert. granted, 338 U.S. 813 (1949), district court aff'd, 339 U.S. 96 (1950).
107 79 F. Supp. at 369.
108. Id. at 370.
109. 174 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1949).
110. Id. at 493.
111. 339 U.S. at 101.
112. 354 Mo. 823, 191 S.W.2d 653 (1945).
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left leg three inches below the knee. The trial court had reduced a jury verdict of
$30,000 to $18,000. The Missouri court pointed out the pain, scars and permanent
damage which she had suffered and stated that the recovery should be fair and
reasonable compensation and that "fair and reasonable compensation in a case
must rest upon the facts as viewed in relation to economic conditions, and with a
regard to reasonable uniformity. 11 3
The court then cited a 1921 decision 1 4 in which the court allowed a recovery
of $13,500 for a three year old boy's loss of one leg above the knee and a 1924 de-
cision-5 in which the court allowed a recovery of $13,500 for a three year old girl's
loss of one leg below the knee. On the basis of these cases the Supreme Court of
Missouri held that the present award of $18,000 "should not be held to be 'out of
line.'"! 16 It would certainly not seem to be "out of line," particularly in view of
the fact that only $4,500 less had been awarded twenty-two years earlier to a three
year old girl suffering substantially the same injuries.
As the chart indicates, only the awards in the Allen case1 17 and the Young
case' 1 8 were lower than the present award. However, it is also noteworthy to point
out that the jury award in both of these cases was affirmed.
In Yozng v. Terminal R.R.," 9 also in 1946, the Supreme Court of Missouri up-
held a recovery of $15,000 for sixty year old railroad employee Maurice Young's
loss of his left leg eight inches below the knee. His life expectancy was 14.10 years
and his average earnings were $212 per month. He could use an artificial limb only
part of the time due to the painful condition of his stump. The court pointed out
that:
Had plaiRtiff not been injured and had he continued as an airman at the
same wage scale from the date of the casualty . . until he attained the
age of sixty-five years, his earnings for such period of time would have
exceeded the jury's award.120
This is the lowest verdict in Missouri in this injury area, as the chart indicates.
However, the criticism of this verdict should be aimed at the jury; the court merely
affirmed its award. This could truly be called an inadequate award and a failure
to give fair and reasonable compensation in view of the fact that plaintiff did not
even recover pecuniary loss, much less what he should have received as non-
pecuniary damages.
In Smiley v. St. Louir-San Francdrco Ry.,' 1949, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri allowed an award of $27,500 for twenty-six year old switchman Clifford Smiley's
loss of his left leg six inches below the groin. His average monthly income for the
113. Id. at 835, 191 S.W.2d at 659.
114. Bryant v. Kansas City Ry., 286 Mo. 342, 228 S.W. 472 (1921).
115. Shields v. Kansas City Ry., 264 S.W. 890 (Mo. 1924).
116. 354 Mo. at 835, 191 S.W.2d at 659.
117. See note 92 supra.
118. See note 117 infra.
119. 192 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1946).
120. Id. at 406.
121. 359 Mo. 474, 222 S.W.2d 481 (1949).
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year prior to the accident was $230.22 The jury verdict of $50,000 was upheld by
the trial court. However, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated that:
We find no case like this as to injuries sustained and probable future re-
sults, but no two cases will be alike. Attempting to -maintain a standard of
uniformity in judgments in personal injury cases presents vexing questions.
We consider economic conditions, earning losses and all other pertinent
factors. And each case must be considered upon its own facts .... Under
all the instant circumstances we believe this judgment is excessive, but
that the rule of uniformity will be observed if the instant judgment finally
stands for $27,50. (Emphasis added.). 2 3
It would appear to present vexatious questions, indeed, if one attempts to
decide each case on its own merits but have the result uniform with the result
of similar, yet unlike, cases. As the chart indicates this is the only award in this
area in which the award of the trial court was reduced on appeal. This reduction
was made solely at the appellate level. It is also apparent that the award is not
uniform with the Affolder award of $80,000 but seems to be more consistent with
the awards in the Young and Petty cases decided-five years earlier. It should be
remembered, however, that the trial court awards in the latter cases were affirmed.
MissouRI's CoMPARATrvE PosMoN.--Missouri's awards in this area are not the
lowest indicated by the chart, but they are much lower than the federal awards
in Missouri and the later awards in other jurisdictions-disproportionately so. In
the Larsen case the award was $50,000 for very similar injuries as those sustained
by Smiley. Yet, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not
find it to be excessive but stated that the fixing of damages lay within the province
of the jury. Missouri could not agree with this view and reduced Smiley's award
to $27,500. No reason for the reduction was specified except that the rule of uni-
formity would be observed if the award was reduced. It could hardly be said that
the federal court allowed $22,500 more than fair and reasonable compensation for
Larsen's injuries. Yet, if that award was right, and the cases during that period
give every reason to think that it was, then the Missouri court in reducing the
Smiley award gave less than fair and reasonable compensation by adhering to some
undefined rule of uniformity.
B. With Other Serious I1jury
CALIFORNIA.-In Huggans v. Southern Pac. R.R.,x  1949, the California District
Court of Appeals for the First District upheld a recovery of $91,000 for twelve
year old Earl Huggans' loss of his left leg below the knee and a major portion of
his right foot. The child's life expectancy was fifty-four years. The court stated:
The special damages pleaded were $11,000 and over $17,000 were proved
at the trial without objection. By limiting the special damages to $11,000
and arbitrarily taking $10,000 as the measure for past and future pain and
122. Very few facts were reported in the case.
123. 359 Mo. at 484, 222 S.W.2d at 487.
124. 92 Cal. App. 2d 599, 207 P.2d 864 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
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suffering appellants arrive at a figure of $70,000 for general damages. Then
by a series of calculation they seek to prove that amortizing $70,000 over
54 years the income to plaintiff will be extravagant. .. . The award for
past and future pain and suffering including the mental anguish and hu-
miliation to be reasonably expected cannot be arbitrarily limited to $10,000
for a 54 year period. ... On the whole case unless we can find that the
award shocks one's sense of justice and raises the presumption that it was
the result of passion and prejudice our duty is to affirm the award....
Applying that rule we cannot find the award excessive.' 2r
GEORG I.-In Western & AtI. R.R. v. Burnett,- 1949, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia upheld a recovery of $65,000 for fifty year old switchman J. G. Burnett's
loss of his right leg below the knee, eight broken ribs, punctured lung,-7 broken
left shoulder and certain back injuries. 128 Plaintiff had been earning about $10 per
day on a regular seven day a week job and his life expectancy was 21.11 years. The
court affirmed the jury award of $65,000 stating:
As Judge Powell said in Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Miller, 5 Ga. App. 402,
406 (63 S.E. 299) 'The fact that a verdict is greatly larger in amount than
the sums fixed usually by juries in similar cases is evidentiary as to bias or
mistake, but is not conclusive.' 12 9
The court then laid down the following rule:
That case. also holds that the right of appellate courts to grant new trials
on excessiveness in verdicts must not be exercised unless the verdict is
shown to be the result of bias or gross mistake, or shows itself to be so.
This test is also applied: 'If the damages are "monstrous indeed, and such
as all mankind must be ready to exclaim against, at first blush," or (we
may add, after mature deliberation), if the thing speaks for itself, the ver-
dict must be considered as the result of bias or mistake for there is no
other reasonable hypothesis.'130
INDLAA.-In New York Cent. R.R. v. Milliser,'8 ' 1952, the Supreme Court of
Indiana upheld a recovery of $50,000 for thirty-nine year old athlete and referee
Mike Milhiser's loss of one leg, crushed arm, severe head injury which badly dam-
aged his eyesight and injured chest. His medical expenses were $7,000 to $10,000.
The court, while of the opinion that the jury was impressed by the unusually
severe injuries sustained, felt there was no indication of prejudice, partiality or
corruption, stating:
The rule is that appellate courts will not reverse judgments in actions
of tort, on the grounds of excessive damages, unless the assessment is so
125. Id. at 615-16, 207 P.2d at 873.
126. 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E.2d 357 (1949).
127. Resulting in a deformed chest and difficult breathing.
128. See 79 Ga. App. at 543-44, 54 S.E.2d at 367 for a more detailed account
of plaintiff's injuries.
129. 79 Ga. App. at 541, 54 S.E.2d at 366.
130. Id. at 542-43, 54 S.E2d at 367.
131. 231 Ind. 180 106 N.E.2d 453 (1952).
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large as to induce the belief that the jury was actuated by prejudice,
partiality or corruption.1
3 2
MxcHGAN.-In Crase v. City of Detroit,3 3 1954, the Supreme Court of Michigan
upheld a recovery of $41,000 for sixty-six year old carpenter Charles Crase's loss
of his right leg and badly injured left foot and ankle. Plaintiffs life expectancy
was 9.48 years, annual wage was about $3,300, medical expenses were $3,840.30 and
loss of future earnings was $24,000. The trial court in reducing the jury verdict of
$56,350 stated that $41,000 would fairly compensate the plaintiff, such sum being
"'far in excess of any jury verdict rendered in this Court and in this type of law-
suit during the recollection of this Court."' 13 4 This action was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Michigan.
NEw JEnsEY.-In Wytupeck v. City of Camden,3 5 1957, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey upheld an award of $170,000L36 for nine year old Henry Wytupeck,
who lost his right leg at the upper one-third of the thigh, suffered third degree
burns over a great part of his body, lost ninety per cent of the use of his left hand
and suffered other injuries. Medical expenses were $9,155.65.-3 The court laid
down the following rule:
[Tjhere may be judicial intervention only if the verdict is so far contrary
to the weight of the evidence as to give rise to the inescapable conclusion
of mistake, passion, prejudice, or partiality.138
NEw YORK-FEDERAL.-In Woodington, v. Pennsylvania R.R., x39 1956, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a recovery of $297,500 for
fifty-three year old engineer Wallace Woodington's loss of his right leg above the
knee. His left leg was stiff below the hip and he lost the use of his right arm and
hand.140 The court upheld the jury verdict of $297,500 stating:
Nor on the evidence of serious and extensive injuries to plaintiff do we
think there was any abuse of discretion [by the trial court] in failing to set
aside the verdict as excessive."'1
PENNSYLVANIA.-In Riester v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,"1 2 1949, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania upheld a recovery of $25,000 for forty-eight year old Anna Riester's
loss of her right leg below the knee and severe injury to her left leg. Her expenses
were about $1,594 and her loss of wages approximated $1,500. The trial court's
reduction of the jury award of $65,000 to $25,000 was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania.
132. Id. at 199-200, 106 N.E.2d at 462.
133. 341 Mich. 132, 67 N.W.2d 93 (1954).
134. Id. at 138, 67 N.W.2d at 96.
135. 25 N.J. 450, 136 A.2d 887 (1957).
136. $150,000 for the boy and $20,000 for his father.
137. The cost of the child's artificial leg during minority would be $1,800.
138. 25 N.J. at 466, 136 A.2d at 896.
139. 236 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 970 (1957).
140. He also suffered other minor injuries.
141. 236 F.2d at 764.
142. 361 Pa. 175, 62 A.2d 845 (1949).
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RHODE ISLAND.-In Di Biase v. Nardolillo,14s 1949, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island upheld an award of $14,500 for fifty-eight year old laborer Louise Di Biase's
loss of his right leg five inches above the knee, nine fractured ribs, fractured left
leg and other injuries. Plaintiff's life expectancy at time of trial was 15.77 years
and there was evidence that he might have to use crutches the rest of his life.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island upheld the jury's award of $14,500 saying it
would not upset the trial court's decision unless it was clearly wrong.144
TExAs.-In Fort Worth, & D.C. Ry. v. Gifford,145 1952, the Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas upheld an award of $72,044.50 to a nineteen year old part-time agricul-
tural worker for the following injuries: loss of left leg above knee, right foot com-
pletely turned around, left shoulder dislocated, some nerves stretched and broken
and numerous other like injuries. He had a life expectancy of fifty years and was
ninety to ninety-five per cent disabled. The jury award of $77,044.50 was -reduced
by the trial court to $72,044.50. This was upheld by the Texas Civil Appeals Court
which concluded:
[Ujnder all of the facts and circumstances, for us to hold that this verdict
is excessive would be in the nature of substituting our judgment for that
of the jury. While this verdict might be more than the court would have
awarded if we had been triers of the facts, nevertheless we are unable to
say that the verdict, though large, shows of itself any bias, any prejudice
or passion, or that it is not supported by the evidence .... 140
WASHINgToN.-In Snyder v. Genera Elec. Co.,.14 1955, the Supreme Court of
Washington upheld a recovery of $42,356.50 for forty-four year old mechanic Homer
Snyder's loss of his left leg at the knee and ten per cent impairment of his right
shoulder. The trial court ordered the jury verdict of $42,356.50 to be reduced to
$21,912.50, believing the jury had used an improper formula to arrive at general
damages. The Supreme Court of Washington held the jury had not used an im-
proper formula and reinstated the jury award.
Mlssoup-FEDERAL.-In St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Ferguson,14s 1950, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld an award of $150,000 for switch-
man Archie Ferguson's loss of his left leg three inches below the hip joint, his right
arm three inches above the wrist and all digits but the thumb and forefinger on
his left hand. Plaintiff was a permanent "wheelchair case" for all practical purposes.
The United States Court of Appeals upheld the jury award of $150,000 stating that
rather than being "'monstrous' or "'outrageous'" the verdict was "not out of
143. 76 R.I. 143, 68 A.2d 89 (1949).
144. The court also stated that it felt "that the jury weighed the facts proper-
ly; brought in a proper verdict; estimated the damages fairly, in every way, and
that their verdict does substantial justice between the parties." Id. at 151, 68 A.2d
at 93.
145. 252 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
146. Id. at 206.
147. 47 Wash. 2d 60, 287 P.2d 108 (1955).
148. 182 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1950).
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line with what juries more and more generally have been doing under present
economic conditions." 1 9
In Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Wichnan,50 1955, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed an award of $50,000 for farm employee
Marvin Wichman's loss of his left leg below the knee and thirty-five per cent im-
pairment of his right hand, on grounds other than excessive damages. Plaintiff's
medical expenses were about $2,000. The trial judge, Reeves, C.J., acting without
jury, had assessed plaintiff's damages at $50,000 saying that his injury was not as
great as those suffered by Guthrie in the Guthrie case 5' and that, in that case, the
reviewing court had felt that verdict was too large.
Missou.-In Joice v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.,1 52 1945, the Supreme Court
of Missouri allowed a recovery of $50,000 for forty-seven year old section foreman
Benjamin Joice's loss of his right leg, leaving a stump of about six and one-half
inches; broken right arm; three cracked ribs and "traumatic-arthritic" changes in
the spine. It was doubtful that he would be able to use the usual artificial leg;lm1
his annual earnings approximated $2,000; and there was testimony to the effect
that he was totally disabled for manual labor. The jury returned a verdict for
$80,000 which was reduced by the trial court to $65,000. The Supreme Court of
Missouri further reduced the award to $50,000. In passing upon the award, the
Supreme Court considered three other cases, Aly v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n.,15 Bond
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,15  and Span v. Jackson Walker Coal & Mining
Co., 50 in which the plaintiffs received $40,000, $35,000 and $50,000 respectively.
The court stated that Joice's injuries were not as severe as those sustained by those
three plaintiffs, and in the light of those awards the present verdict was excessive
in the amount which exceeded $50,000.
In Dickson v. Beemer,57 1949, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld an
award of $5,000 for sixty year old Fred Dickson's loss of his right leg eight inches
below the hip, laceration of the scalp and cerebral concussion. When injured he was
earning $6 per day. Seven years later, at trial, he was earning $30 per week.
Plaintiff appealed the jury verdict of $5,000 as inadequate. However, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that this was not grossly inadequate, nor the result of pas-
sion or prejudice and affirmed the award.
REASONS Foa RnMrrrIruR.-In Magerko v. West Penn. Rys.,15s the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania ordered a $4,000 remittitur saying that a "strong sympathy moved
the jury." There was no further explanation of this "sympathy." In Joice v. Mis-
149. Id. at 956.
150. 220 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1955), reversing, Wichman v. Allis Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 117 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
151. See note 72 supra.
152. 354 Mo. 439, 189 S.W.2d 568 (1945).
153. Id. at 453, 189 S.W.2d at 576.
154. 342 Mo. 1116, 119 S.W.2d 363 (1938).
155. 315 Mo. 987, 288 S.W. 777 (1926).
156. 322 Mo. 158, 16 S.W.2d 190 (1929).
157. 217 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. 1949).
158. See note 141 supra.
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sowri-Kansas-Texas .R.R.:'5 the Supreme Court of Missouri ordered a remittitur of
$15,000 on the basis of a comparison of the Joice award with awards affirmed in
-1938, 1926 and 1929 decisions.L 0 This hints strongly of the desire for uniformity
in awards on the part of the Supreme Court of Missouri which has been mentioned
by it in many of its cases.161 Whether this desire for uniformity has overshadowed
the concept of fair and reasonable compensation can perhaps be answered by further
examination of Missouri's comparative position.
MIssouRI's COMPARATIVE Posrbo.-The Missouri award in the Joice case (1945)
would appear to compare favorably with the California decision in the Huggans case
(1949) even though the Hatggans award was $91,000 compared to the Joice award of
$50,000. On the basis of Joice alone it would seem possible that if Missouri were
faced with the factual situation obtaining in the Huggans case in 1949 that it could
affirm such an award. Yet, when the other Missouri cases during this period and
following are examined (as they appear on the chart), it is noted that not until
1959 did the Missouri court uphold an award for $150,000 for substantially the
loss of both legs.162
A further examination of the chart also points out that there are many cases
in which the plaintiff received less than $50,000. The factual differences in many
of these cases will account for their low verdicts. As to the other cases it can only
be said that, with the exception of the Magerko case,10 3 the reduction was made by
the trial judge who, it has been said, is in the best position to determine the true
situation and to rule accordingly. In the Joice case, even though the trial judge had
reduced the verdict from $80,000 to $65,000, the Supreme Court of Missouri saw
fit to reduce further the award to $50,000. The only other similar action taken by
an appellate court in this area was that of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
the Magerko case. The Pennsylvania court, however, based its reduction on a
"strong sympathy" which moved the jury rather than upon earlier cases which
affirmed lower awards. It is doubtful that the action of the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri in the Joice case can be sustained on the ground that such a reduction would
more nearly afford the plaintiff "just and reasonable compensation" for his injuries.
The Dickson award seems justified in view of the relatively small loss in wages
and the short life expectancy of the plaintiff.
The position of the Missouri federal courts seems to be more in accord with
that of other courts. The award in the Ferguson case ($150,000), is what the jury
found to be "fair and reasonable compensation." Neither the trial nor appellate
court altered the award. They cannot be criticized because the jury did not give a
159. See note 152 supra.
160. See notes 154, 155 and 156 supra.
161. E.g., Scneder v. Wabash R.R., 272 S.W.2d 198, 208 (Mo. 1954) ("As to
amount, the only standard available is a reasonable degree of uniformity . . .");
Ketcham v. Thomas, 283 S.W.2d 642, 652 (Mo. 1955) ("[Dlue consideration
should be given to approved awards in other cases, when a comparison can be made,
so that approximate uniformity in awards for damages may be obtained").
162. Moore v. Ready-Mixed Concrete Co., sutpra note 55.
163. See note 141 supra.
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larger verdict. On the whole it would appear that the federal courts in Missouri
have come closer to meting out "fair and reasonable compensation" to plaintiffs
than have the state courts.
V. Loss OF BOTH ARMs
It is a very rare occasion that a person loses both arms. Hence, there is only one
reported case in this period in which the plaintiff did lose both arms. That is the
case of Pierce v. United States164 decided by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee in 1955. James Pierce, a lineman, lost both arms
below the elbow and suffered a concussion with possible brain damage as the result
of having a 4160-voltage current pass through his body. The court, sitting without
jury, set the award at $53,984.81 and costs. On appeal the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision. No mention was made of the
amount of the verdict.
VI. Loss OF ONE ARM
ALABAMA.-In Southern Ry. v. Pulen,165 1947, the Supreme Court of Alabama up-
held a recovery of $40,000 for William Pullen's loss of an arm. The jury's award of
$55,000 was reduced to $40,000 by the trial court. No further facts were reported.1 66
CALIFORNI.-In Kircher v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry.,167 1948, the Supreme Court
of California upheld a recovery of $60,000 for twenty-three year old aviation cadet
Kenneth Kircher's loss of his left hand. In affirming the jury's award the California
court stated:
An allowance of damages is primarily a factual matter . . . and it is
well settled that even though the award may seem large to a reviewing
court, it will not interfere unless the allowance is so grossly dispropor-
tionate to a sum reasonably warranted by the facts as to shock the sense
of justice and raise a presumption that it was the result of passion and
prejudice1 8
FLORmA.-In Florida Power & Light v. Hargrove,'8 9 1948, the Supreme Court of
Florida upheld a recovery of $50,000 for forty-three year old lineman John Har-
grove's loss of his right arm just below the elbow, burned right leg and other seri-
ous injuries. His life expectancy was twenty-five years and his annual wage was
$6,500. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the jury verdict of $50,000 saying
that:
164. 142 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Tenn. 1955), aff'd, 235 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1956).
165. 248 Ala. 665, 29 So. 2d 228 (1947).
166. This case is made almost useless, for purposes of analyzing the award, by
the court's failure to report the essential facts.
167. 32 Cal. 2d 176, 195 P.2d 427 (1948), reversing, 183 P.2d 105 (Cal. App.
1947).
168. Id. at 434.
169. 160 Fla. 405, 35 So. 2d 1 (1948).
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There is not the slightest intimation that it was prejudiced or that it
was influenced by improper motives. . . It would be trite to argue that
this Court is not authorized preemptorily to set a verdict aside because it
would have awarded a different amount. It must be shown to be without
justification in the record, and we find no such showing here.170
ILLINOIS.-In Eizerman v. Behnd,'7 1956, the Appellate Court of Illinois for the
First District upheld a recovery of $70,000 for forty-eight year old Daniel Eizerman's
loss of his right arm three and one-half inches from the shoulder stating that there
was nothing in the record to indicate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury
and that the verdict was not so palpably excessive as to indicate such passion or
prejudice.
INDIANA.-In Norwalk Truck Line Co. v. Kostka,17 2 1949, the Appellate Court of
Indiana upheld a recovery of $30,000 for Edward Kostka's loss of his left arm at
the shoulder and concussion of the brain. In upholding the jury award of $30,000
the Indiana court stated:
In view of the fact that the injury resulted in a serious, permanent handi-
cap to a man 23 years old at the time of the accident and having a life
expectancy between 39 and 40 years, it cannot be said that the verdict in-
duces a belief that it was the result of prejudice, partiality, or corrup-
tion.173
LouIsIANA-FEDEAL.-In Texas Pac.-Mo. Pac. Term. R.R. v. Welsh,'T 4 1950, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a recovery of $48,000
for switchman Leonard Welsh's loss of an arm stating that it did not have the
power to reduce an award for excessiveness.175 No further facts were reported.
LouIslAN.-In Davis v. Dept. of Highways,76 1953, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
upheld a recovery of $25,488.95 for forty-five year old oil field worker James Davis'
loss of his left arm. He had been earning $200 per month prior to the accident.
The Louisiana court -upheld the jury award stating that it was neither excessive
nor inadequate after a review of the awards in similar cases.
MINNESTA.-In Hallada v. Great Northern Ry.,'17 1955, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota allowed a recovery of $105,000 for thirty year old switchman William
Hallada's loss of his right arm two and one-half inches from the shoulder. He
had a life expectancy of 38.80 years, had previously been earning $450 per month
and could not use an artificial limb. The Supreme Court of Minnesota set out the
following test:
170. Id. at 409, 35 So. 2d at 3.
171. 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1st Dist. 1956).
172. 120 Ind. App. 383, 88 N.E.2d 799 (1949).
173. Id. at 402, 88 N.E.2d at 805-06.
174. 179 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1950).
175. See note 76 supra.
176. 68 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 1953).
177. 244 Minn. 81, 69 N.W.2d 673, reiittitur filed, 245 Minn. 581, 72 N.W.2d
74, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874 (1955).
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Whether an injured person has been made financially whole must be'tested
by determining what the total amount of damages awarded by the jury will
accomplish for him if conserved and used with ordinary prudence.178
The court in reducing the jury award of $170,154.81, pointed out that by invest-
ing the jury award at three and one-fourth per cent, plaintiff would receive
$5,530.03 interest annually, or slightly more than his annual pre-injury wage, and
would still have the principal intact at his death. The court concluded that the
award, though excessive, did not show passion or prejudice but was the result of
totally relying upon mathematical formulas and not testing the reasonableness of
the verdict from the standpoint of its overall effect
Whatever process is adopted in fixing an injured person's damages, the
reasonableness of the lump sum awarded by the jury must, in the last
analysis, also be tested from the unitary standpoint of what total financial
benefits that lump sum will confer upon the injured person as a means of
making him financially whole. No award can be sustained unless it stands
the test of reasonableness in the light of its overall effect.1r 9
NEw Mnxico.-In Turietta v. Wyche,5 ° 1949, the Supreme Court of New Mexi-
co upheld a recovery of $15,000 for mechanic Ben Turrietta's loss of his left arm
above the elbow stating that:
While the verdict is large, it is supported by substantial evidence.
We cannot say as a matter of law that it is excessive.181
NEw Yoax.,FmZED .-- In Fiskratti v. Pensylvania R.R., 8 2 1957, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld a recovery of
$169,651.68 for twenty-four year old Martin Fiskratti's loss of his right forearm;
third, fourth and fifth digits of his left hand; broken nose and other injuries. He
had a life expectancy of 47.49 years, had had numerous operations and skin grafts,
and was thought to be eighty to ninety per cent permanently disabled even with an
artificial limb. In affirming the juror award, the court set out the following rule:
In determining whether the amount of damages awarded to the
plaintiff are excessive, this Court will be guided by the rule expressed in
Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565, 6 S. Ct. 501, 509, 29 L. Ed. 729,
which is as follows:
' * * a verdict will not be set aside in a case of tort for excessive
damages "unless the court can clearly see that the jury have committed
some very gross and palpable error, or have acted under some improper
bias, influence or prejudice, or have totally mistaken the rules of law by
which the damages are to be regulated," that is, "unless the verdict is so
excessive or outrageous," with reference to all the circumstances of the
case, "as to demonstrate that the jury have acted against the rules of law,
or have suffered their passions, their prejudices, or their perverse disre-
178. 244 Minn. at 97, 69 N.W.2d at 686.
179. Id. at 99, 69 N.W.2d at 687.
180. 54 N.M. 5, 212 P2d 1041 (1949).
181. Id. at 17, 212 P.2d at 1049.
182. 147 F. Supp. 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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gard of justice to mislead them." In no case is it permissible for the court
to substitute itself for the jury, and compel a compliance on the part of
the latter with its own view of the facts in evidence, as the standard and
measure of that justice, which the jury itself is the appointed constitutional
tribunal to award.' 8 3
Oto.-In Lnceente v. Philipedex,1 8' 1945, the Court of Appeals of Ohio upheld
a recovery of $10,000 for thirty-three year old Primio Lucente's loss of part of his
left hand. He had been earning $60 to $65 per week. In affirming the jury's award
of $10,000 the court stated:
Considering the record with reference to the size of the verdict in its
entirety, this court cannot reach the conclusion that the sum awarded by
the jury is so grossly out of proportion to the compensation to which
plaintiff is entitled as to shock us into the certainty that this verdict had
its source in the passion or prejudice of the jury .... 185
TmNEssE.-In Gibson City Elec. v. HaM,16 1947, the Court of Appeals of Ten-
nessee upheld a recovery of $10,000 for fifty-nine year old farm laborer Rufas Hall's
loss of his right arm and serious burns on the left side of his body. He had been
earning $2.50 per day. In affirming the jury award of $10,000 the court stated that:
"no rule has been formulated by which to determine with certainty the damages to
which a plaintiff in a case of this kind is entitled." The court also stated that: "the
right to revise even the amount of the verdict by the process of suggesting a
remittitur is a delicate one and one which the courts should be slow to adopt."187
"[We do] not feel justified in substituting our judgment for that of the jury and the
trial judge, especially since they had an opportunity, denied us, to observe on the
plaintiff's body the nature and extent of the injuries as reflected thereby."18
TxxAs.-In Alpine Tel. Corp. v. McCall,18 9 1946, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
upheld a recovery of $42,500"90 for fourteen year old Earl McCall's loss of his left
arm above the elbow and serious injury to his right leg. Plaintiff was eighty per
cent permanently disabled. The Texas court affirmed the .jury award of $42,500
because:
The verdict is not so manifestly excessive as to show passion or prejudice,
or to require this court to substitute its judgment for that of the jury.1"'
In Tri-County Elec. Co-op. v. Clair,202 1949, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
allowed a recovery of $20,950 for forty-eight year old tree trimmer William Clair's
loss of one arm below the elbow and a fifteen per cent loss of use in the other arm.
183. Id. at 767.
184. 68 N.E.2d 558 (Ohio App. 1945).
185. Id. at 562.
186. 32 Tenn. App. 394, 222 S.W.2d 689 (1947).
187. Id. at 407-08, 222 S.W.2d at 695-96.
188. Id. at 408, 222 S.W.2d at 696.
189. 195 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
190. $10,000 to the father and $32,500 to the injured boy.
191. 195 S.W.2d at 593.
192. 217 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
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He had been earning $47 per week. The Texas court reduced the jury verdict of'
$25,950 by $5,000 after concluding:
In the great majority of the reported cases the verdicts in cases ia-
volving injuries similar to those in the present case have been much less
than $25,000, although in two or three cases, of which Sprickerhoff v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 323 Ill. App. 340, 55 N.E. 2d 532, is an example,
verdicts for even more than $25,000 for loss of an arm have been upheld.
It will be seen from the authorities cited that verdicts as large as that in
the present case have been held excessive in a number of instances. 193
In Tripp v. Watson,'9 1950, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld a recovery
of $15,000 for Eddie Watson's loss of one arm stating that the evidence sustained
the award.
In Pittman v. Baladez,195 1957, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals upheld a
recovery of $35,000 for twenty-four year old farm worker W. E. Pittman's loss of
his left arm at the shoulder and fractured skull. He had a life expectancy of forty-
three years, could not wear an artificial limb and had medical expenses of $1,949.
The Texas court upheld the jury award of $35,000 stating:
There is no fixed rule or standard to be accepted in determining whether
a verdict in a particular case is in fact excessive except to determine what
amount of money 'an honest and impartial jury, uninfluenced by passion,
prejudice or other improper motive, may deem adequate' to reasonably
and fairly compensate the injured person for injuries sustained:.19
UTAH.-In Bennett v. Denver & R.G.W. R.R.,19T 1950, the Supreme Court of Utah
upheld a recovery of $50,00011 s for twenty-six year old brakeman Charles Bennett's
loss of his right arm just below the shoulder. He had a life expectancy of 38.12
years and had been earning about $350 per month. In affirming the jury verdict
of $50,000 the court stated:
Present verdicts doubtless seem very high in view of past experience
in this state, but it is just as valid a conclusion that injured men may
have been awarded too little in the past as it is that they are awarded
too much now. Perhaps both are the case.199
MissounR.-In Gordon v. Muehling Packing Co.,200 1931, the Supreme Court of
Missouri allowed a recovery of $17,000 for forty-one year old packing house em-
ployee Sam Gordon's loss of his left hand at the wrist when caught in defendant's
sausage grinder. He had been earning approximately $150 per month and under-
193. Id. at 687. The award in the Sprickerhoif case was $30,000.
194. 235 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
195. 304 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957), reversed on other grounds, 312
S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1958).
196. 304 S.W.2d at 606-07.
197. 117 Utah 57, 213 P.2d 325 (1950).
198. $70,000 less $20,000 for contributory negligence.
199. 117 Utah at 73, 213 P.2d at 333.
200. 328 Mo. 123, 40 S.W.2d 693 (1931).
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went three or four operations. The jury award of $25,000 was reduced by the trial
court to $21,000. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated:
[C)omparing the amount of damages in this case with the amount allowed
in other cases ... [citing cases] where the injuries were similar to those in
the present case, we could well hold that $15,000 would be the limit to
the damages in this case. However, on account of plaintiff's large expendi-
tures for hospital fees and medical attention and his unusual suffering
both in the manner of his injury and in attempts to cure the same, this
amount should be increased to $17,000. 201
In Reeves v. Thompson, 20 2 1948, the Supreme Court of Missouri allowed a
recovery of $15,000 for twenty-seven year old Ermal Reeves' loss of his right arm
at the elbow, back injury and injury to the entire right side of his body. He had
been earning $110 per month. In reducing the jury award of $22,500 to $15,000
the Supreme Court of Missouri stated that a claim that a verdict was the result
of passion and prejudice is "vitally different" from one of excessiveness, in that
"an excessive verdict does not necessarily reflect passion and prejudice on the part
of the jury."20 3 The court found no passion or prejudice. In discussing the Gordon
case 204 the court stated:
A verdict for $25,000 was reduced to $17,000. In the brief counsel for
plaintiff, in the present case, in the defense of the verdict, stress the pur-
chasing power of money. That of course is important in dealing with an
assignment on an alleged excessive verdict, and we do not overlook such.
However, we think the rule of uniformity would be more nearly observed
if the present verdict be reduced to $15,000. (Emphasis added.) 205
RE~soNs FOR R~mrrrrruR.-In the Hallada case,200 1955, the Supreme Court of Min-
nesota reduced the jury verdict of $170,154.81 to $105,000 upon the basis that the
plaintiff could invest the $170,154.81, receive more per year in interest than his
pre-injury wage and have the principal intact at his death. At first blush this
seems reason enough to order a remittitur. However, when it is taken into consid-
eration that the plaintiff will be without his arm for the rest of his life (estimated
over 38 years), has undergone much pain and suffering, can no longer engage in
his chosen vocation and will have to suffer the humiliation and embarrassment of
his injury the rest of his life, the strength of the court's reasoning withers. It
would seem that the court is interested only in making the plaintiff whole as to
his pecuniary loss and not particularly interested in compensating him for the in-
tangible elements of his loss.
In the Clair case,20 7 1949, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals reduced the jury
verdict of $25,950 to $20,950. The reason given was that the majority of the re-
ported cases involving similar injuries sustained awards of much less than $25,000.
201. Id. at 142-43, 40 S.W.2d at 702.
202. 357 Mo. 847, 211 S.W.2d 23 (1948).
203. Id. at 857, 211 S.W.2d at 29.
204. See note 200 supra.
205. 357 Mo. at 858, 211 S.W.2d at 30.
206. See note 177 supra.
207. See note 192 supra.
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It would seem that the Texas approach in this case is very similar to that of the
Missouri courts in striving for uniformity of awards. However, unlike the Texas
courts, the Missouri courts have seemed unwilling to look at reported cases from
other jurisdictions. It should be noted, also, that the view of the Texas court in
the Pittman case,208 1957, is far removed from the view expressed in earlier
Texas cases. This may be due to a new concept on their part, or a difference in
the views of the various appellate courts. It is submitted that the Missouri courts
would do well to adopt a concept similar to that expressed in the Pittnan case.
In the Gordon case,20 9 1931, the Supreme Court of Missouri is again found
reducing an award so that it will conform to the "rule of uniformity." There was,
however, no indication of why, if the verdict could be raised to $17,000, the award
could not be raised to $21,000, the sum entered by the trial court. It would seem
that the Supreme Court of Missouri again put itself in the position of the jury and
trial judge and awarded what it thought would reasonably compensate the plain-
tiff.
In the Reeves case,210 1948, the Supreme Court of Missouri again applied the
"rule of uniformity" to a jury award of $22,500 and found it to be excessive in the
sum which exceeded $15,000. The "rule of uniformity" seems to lead anywhere
but to "fair and reasonable compensation." The court here granted the same
award which seventeen years earlier it had said was not quite enough for a lesser
injury to a plaintiff fourteen years older than Reeves. It appears that here the
Supreme Court of Missouri abandoned the "rule of uniformity" in order to reduce
an award.
MissouRI's COMPARATIVE POslTIoN.-It can hardly be disputed that the awards
in both the Gordon and Reeves cases were far below that which other courts have
thought to be "fair and reasonable compensation" for similar injuries. As the chart
indicates there were two awards in this area lower than that granted in the Reeves
case.211 It should be noted, however, that in both of those cases the award affirmed
was that granted by the jury. In both cases in which remittiturs were ordered, the
final award was well above the award sustained in either Missouri case.2 = It would
also seem apparent that if the Missouri court were faced with an award such as
that granted in the Fiskratti case ($169,651.68) it would not be sustained. It is
very doubtful that the Missouri court would sustain many of the awards granted
by the other appellate courts in this area. Running down the final awards sustained
by these other jurisdictions, with the language of the Missouri court and its de-
sire for uniformity in mind, the reader can easily point to a dozen awards which
the Missouri court would in all likelihood not have sustained. The reason can be
stated in four words: "The rule of uniformity." So long as the "rule of uniformity"
is applied as it has previously been applied, Missouri plaintiffs cannot hope to
208. See note 195 supra.
209. See note 200 supra.
210. See note 202 supra.
211. Lmuente and Ha/ cases.
212. See "Final award" column of the chart.
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have their awards reviewed upon the basis of what would be "fair and reasoriable
compensation" but will have to be content with having the award measured by
the "rule."
In view of the Moore case2 13 and the apparently new outlook of the Supreme
Court of Missouri contained therein, it is to be hoped that the "rule" has been
broken and in its place the court will use the guide of "fair and reasonable com-
pensation" with due regard for the opinion of the jury and the trial judge, both
being in a better position to determine the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and
losses.
VII. Loss oF FINGERS
There were no reported Missouri cases in this area during the period under
review which the writer could uncover. A detailed discussion of these cases would
unreasonably lengthen this article. This is particularly true in view of the com-
binations of digits which may be lost. As can be seen from the enclosed chart, the
injuries are so diverse that a comparison of the cases is very difficult, if possible
at all. It is suggested that a study of the chart would be of more benefit to the
reader than a discussion of the cases. The cases set out there will give an idea of
what the appellate courts have done in reference to awards for the loss of certain
digits. The attitudes of the courts are very similar to the views enumerated by the
courts in the prior discussion concerning the loss of legs and arms.
VIII. MissouRi's GENERAL POSITION
The juries in Missouri, the chart indicates, grant approximately the same
amount of damages granted in other jurisdictions for similar injuries. The judg-
ments entered by Missouri trial courts also conform to those of other jurisdictions.
The rub comes at the appellate level A look at the chart would convince any plain-
tiff that an appeal to the Supreme Court will almost always result in a reduction
of his award. In the great majority of the cases shown on the chart the Supreme
Court has substantially reduced the award given the plaintiff by the jury and the
trial court.
If "fair and reasonable compensation" is the standard for reviewing a personal
injury award, then it becomes evident that in many cases the jury and trial judge
are unable to determine what amount constitutes "fair and reasonable compensa-
tion." Time after time the Supreme Court has found that the learned trial judge,
though he ordered a remittitur, did not take away enough. The fact that the trial
judge was in a better position "to observe on the plaintiff's body the nature and
extent of the injuries as reflected thereby"214 seems to have been disregarded. In
view of the action of the Missouri Supreme Court it would seem that only the
Supreme Court can really tell what constitutes "just and reasonable compensation."
213. See note 55 sunpra.
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COMMENTS
The Supreme Court, in many cases, appears to rely solely upon the "rule of uni-
formity" while paying lip service to the rule that each case must be determined
on its own facts.
In some of the cases in which the Supreme Court of Missouri sustained the
award, the reason for 'such action is quite clear. The Young case,2 15 1946, is a
glowing example. The jury awarded Young $15,000 for the loss of a leg below the
knee. In 1931 the court had sustained $17,000 in the Gordon case216 as compen-
sation of the loss of a hand. In 1945 the court had sustained $18,000 for the loss
of a leg below the knee.217 How could it then, one year later, have any doubt that
the $15,000 award in the Young case should be sustained. Yet, the court had to
examine earlier cases just to make sure that the awards were uniform.
This examination for uniformity takes place in almost every case. Prior to the
Moore case previous awards were found to be most persuasive. In examining the
chart it can be seen that for years the monetary amounts of Missouri's awards were
almost static. The court relied upon prior cases as the true compensation which
should be given. The cost of living rose, money became cheaper and the price of
human life became more dear, but the amount of the precedents of uniformity did
not increase nor did later awards. The "rule of uniformity" continued to be applied
as strictly as before, perhaps even more strictly. Other jurisdictions not being tied
as tightly to precedent, allowed larger awards. Could it be that these other juris-
dictions were wrong and were awarding far more than was necessary to fairly and
reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his injuries? Is it not "just as valid a con-
clusion that injured men may have been awarded too little in the past as it is
that they are awarded too much now"?218
It is submitted that it would be better for the Missouri court to disregard past
awards and to limit itself to an examination of the facts of each case, giving the
same weight to the decision of the trial judge that it would give on any other point.
IX. CoNcLUsIoN
The several appellate courts have laid down various rules to be used when
examining personal injury awards for excessiveness. If passion or prejudice on the
part of the jury is alleged and shown almost all courts will order a remittitur or re-
mand the case. Different rules are applied if the court just thinks the award is
too large. The court may decide that even though it thinks the award is too large
it can do nothing about it. This was the early attitude of some federal courts. Then
in the Affolder case 219 the Supreme Court stated that the award could be sustained
because the award was not "monstrous." The federal courts then generally came
215. See note 117 rupra.
216. See note 200 supra.
217. Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 110.
218. Bennett v. Denver & R.G.W. R.R., 117 Utah 57, 73, 213 P.2d 325, 333
(1950).
219. 339 U.S. 96 (1949).
19601
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1960], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol25/iss3/7
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to believe that the award could be reduced if it could be termed "monstrous" or
"grossly excessive. '220
Some courts will reduce a verdict if they find that it is so excessive as to indi-
cate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Others will affirm the award if
reasonable men could differ in opinion as to its excessiveness. Still another would
not reduce the award unless it were found to be excessive on the record. The Mis-
souri courts will reduce the award if it is not in uniformity with prior awards.
The application of these various rules result in various final awards. Yet the
awards are not as varied as the rules would seem to indicate. Much of the differ-
ence in the awards is the result of different jury awards and not appellate action.
Injuries are not exactly alike; there is no reason why awards should be alike. Each
plaintiff is entitled to "just and reasonable compensation" for his injuries. If the
jur was properly instructed and no error can be found in the record, there would
appear to be no more reason for upsetting the judgment of the trial court in this
area than any other area of the law. The triers of fact and the trial judge have to
find the award to be proper. It would seem incumbent upon the appellate court to
exercise the utmost caution in finding such an award to be excessive, particularly
in view of the fact that
the fixing of the amount of damages in an action for personal injuries is
peculiarly within the province of the jury, there being no regular standard
by which to measure.221
It is submitted that this course of action would result in more nearly awarding the
plaintiff "fair and reasonable compensation" for his injuries.
JAMEs W. RINER
220. Id. at 101.
221. Larsen v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 171 F.2d 841, 84 (7th Cir. 1948).
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CASE EXPEC- & AVERAGE TRIAL LATE
NO. CITATION AGE TANCY WAGE INURY JURY COURT COURT
1 Goertz v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 19 ILL App. 2d 261, Lost both legs 10" below hips; lost left arm 9" above elbow.
153 IE. 2d 486 (1st Dist. 1958). 62 12 Dress cutter Could use prosthesis. $800.000 $200,000
2 Union Pac. R.i v. Johnson, 249 F.2d 674 Lost both legs below knees; lost right arm close to shoulder.
(9th Cir. 1957). 23 40 $3.600 Could use prosthesis. 225.000 225,000
3 hubbard v. Long sland R.R., 152 F. Supp. 1 Brakeman Lost both legs below knees.
(E.D. N.Y. 1957). 23 45.61 $5,500 226.000 226000
4 Atlantic C.L RNB v. tRobertson, 214 F. 2d 746 Lost bath legs below knees.
(4th Cir. 1954). 80.000 80,000
5 Conkey V. New York CenL B-R. 206 Misc. 1077, Brakeman Lost both legs close to hip. Way not be able to use prosthesis.
136 N.Y.S. 2d 189 (Sup. CL 1954). 40 29.25 $4.830 Lost future earnises were 8101.000. 375,000 210.000
6 Smith V. Ill Cent. B-B" 43IL App. 19, 99 Laborer 
Lost beth legs at m dth$gh.
N.E.2d 717 (Ist Dist. 1951). 21 45 $2.60 185,000 185,000
7 McNulty v. Southern Pac. R.-, 96 Cal. App. 2d 841, San temployee Lost right leg 3" above knee; lost leIt leg 3" below knee.
216 P.2d 534 (lst Dist. 1950). 42 26 84.280 Could and did use prOsthesIs. 100,000 100,000
8 Texas & Pac. O.H. v. Crown, 220 S.W.2d 294 Carpenter Lost one leg 4" below Wee; lot other 7 1/2" below knee.
(Ter. Civ. App. 1949). 22 20 Did use prosthesis. 50,000 12.500
9 Counts v. Thompson, 359 5. 485, 222 S.w.d 487 Brakeman Lost both legs below upper 2/3 o1 thigh. Could not use
(1949). 35 prosthesis. 165.000 $140,000 80,000
10 Batebugh v. Pennsylvania RN., 78 N.E.2d 410 Lost one leg 4" below hip; lost other 8) below hip. Would re-
hA 1948----e---..-erboe s o------------------------- sthesis. 22 - -00-0 2225000
Bartlebaugh v. Pennsylvania R.R, 150 Ohio St. 387,
82 N.E.2d 853 (1948). 150,000
11 Greenburg v. Garlield-Passaic Bus Co., 134 N.J.L. 17.4 Lost both legs below knees.
371, 48 A.2d 389 (1946). 55 (F) 50.000 60,000
12 Delaney v. New York Cent. RRH., 68 F. Supp. 70 Lost both legs 4" below buttocks. Cannot use prosthesis.
(S.D. N.Y. 1946). 30 35 165,000 165,000
13 Beam v. Baltimore & O.R.R, 77 Ohio App. 419, 68 Brakeman Lost both legs below knees. Had used prosthesis.
N.E.2d 159 (1945). 25 $3,360 75,000 78.000
14 Korn v. lanley, 194 Okla. 574, 153 P.2d 623 (1944). 33 35 Laborer Lost both lees "shortly below torso." 50.000 101700
15 McKinney v. Pittsburgh & L, E. .K, 57 . Supp. Lost both legs between ankle and knee.
813 (S.D. N.Y. 1944). 43 26 $2,805 130.000 100.000
16 Avance v. Thompson, 320 IlL App. 406, 51 N.E.2d Lost right leg 3' above knee, left leg 4" below knee.
334 (4th Dist. 1943). 22 40.17 125,000 100.000 160.000
17 Russell v. Monongahela Ry., 159 F. Supp 650 Brakeman Lost lower left leg. Could use prosthesis. 186,735 186,735
(W.D. Pa, 1958). 37.6 $6,000
18 Hecknthorne v. Pennsylvania R.R., 156 F. Supp. 824 Lost leg above knee.
(W.D. Pa. 1957). 105.000 105000
19 Rlnghiser v. Chesapeake & O.F.R., 148 F. Supp. 529 R.R. Engineer Lost right leg.
(S.D. Ohio 1956) . 40.000 40.000
RiLnghlser v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 241 F.2d 416
- --- -- - -6t c f_. J6._ . -.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-- ---
Righlser v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 354 U.S. 901 Reversed on
(1957). other grounds
20 Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line RN.R, 80 So. 2d 662 Lost left leg.
-(9la. 1955). 8 56 248.430 1231431 187 411
Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 96 So. 2d 127
(Fla, 1957) (en banc). 187,411
21 Leming v. O1leLs Trucng Co., 44 Cal, 2d 343, Truck driver Lost right leg; left leg shortened 1/2" to 3/4". Cannot wear
282 P.2d 23 (1955). 47 23.08 $4,924 prosthesis. 213,460 213,460
22 Horwitz Iron & Metal Co. v. Myler, 207 Okla. 691, Lost left leg above knee.
252 P.2d 475 (1952). 26,000 26.000
23 Allen v. Simpson. 95 F. Supp. 535 (BLD. Pa. 1951). 23 (F) Waitress Lost left leg below knee. Could use prosthesis. 8,000 8.0
24 Teaxa & N.O. IRN v. Darton, 241 S.W.2d 181 Vise. worker Lost right leg above knee.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951). 19 600 per hour 21,236 21,236
21 _I gerko v. west Penn. Rys., 365 Pa. 609, 76 A.2d 21 Lost right foot.
618 (1950). Mos. 24.000 20.000 16,000
26 Southern Pac. R.R. v. Guthrie, 180 F.2d 295 R.R. Engineer Lost right leg above knee.
........- 9_4_. __ m.1_9 ---..................................... a.. ................. . G_ . ---................................................................................. 29 _ -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 22
Southern Pac. R.R. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926
(9th Cir. 1951). 100.000
27 Relnmueller v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 341 IL. Lost left leg below knee.
App. 178. 93 H.E.2d 120 (lst Dist 1950). 68 (F) 45.000 45.000
28 Pennsylvania RN. v. Ackerson, 183 F.2d 662 Lost one leg.
(6th Cir. 1950). (F) 25,000 25,000
29 Larsen v. Chicago & N.W. Hy., 171 F.2d 841 Conductor Lost left leg 10" below knee.
(7th Cir. 1949). 50,000 50.000
30 Smiley v. St. Louts S. F. W., 359 MO. 474, 222 Lost left leg 6" below groin. Had spur condition which would
S.W.2d 481 (1949). 26 have to be corrected. 50.000 27,500
31 Allolder v. New York, C. & St. L B--, 79 F. Supp. Switchman Lost right leg 4" below hip. Would require more surgery.
365 (E.D. Mo. 1948). 35 37+ $4,800 8------------------------------------------- 0 0,000
New York, C. & St. L. R N. v. Affolder, 174 F.2d New trial us
---- 5ab.C1141 --- ------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------- AbP~fu1~
New York, C. & St L R.. v. Affolder, 339 U.S.
96 (1950). 80,000
32 Brown v. intercoastai 'isertes, 34 Wash. 20 48, Seaman Lost left leg above ankle.
207 P.2d 1205 (1949). 28 36 25,000 25,000
33 Murphy v. Friel, 328 ILL App. 586, 66 N.E.2d 450 Odd jobs Lost left leg.
(1st DisL 1946). 75,000 New trial
34 Jones v. Ambrose, 128 W. Va. 715, 38 S.E.2d 263 Lost right leg, 1/3 of thigh remaining. 20,000 20,000
(1946). 14
35 Petty v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 354 Mo. 823, Lost left leg 3" below knee. Could use prosthesis.
191 S.W.2d 653 (1945). 3 (F) 30.000 18.000 18,000
35 Young v. Terminal R. As'n, 192 S.W.2d 402 R. yard worker Lost left leg 8" below kmee. Could use prosthesis part of the
(Mo. 1946). 59 14.10 $212 per month time. 15,000 15.000
37 Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 136 A.2d Lost right leg, 1/3 of thigh remaining; 3d degree burns over
887 (1957). 9 most of body, left hand 90% disabled. Could use prosthesis. 150.000 150,000
18 Ceresto v. New York, N. I., & H1. RN., 231 F.2d 50 Lost one leg above knee.
(2d Cir. 1956). 125,000 125,000
39 Woodington v. Pennsylvania RN., 236 F.2d 760 Lost right leg between hip and knee; left leg stilff at knee, ankle
(2d Cr. 1956). 53 20-23 $5,000 and toes; lost use of right hand and arm; other injuries. 297.500 297.500
40 Wiham v. Allis-Chalmers 10fg. Co., 117 F. Supp. Lost right leg just below knee; 35% impairment o right hand.
857..... TD -o --------------------------------------------------------------.... - - - - ------ - - - - -.-............
Allis-Chlers Mfg. Co. v. WFIcham, 220 F.2d 426 New trial on
(8th Cir. 1955). other grounds
41 - nyder v. General Elec. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 60, 287 Mechanic Lost left leg at knee; 10% impairment of right shoulder.
P.2d 108 (1955) (en bane). 44 39.944 19,500 39,944
42 Cra e v. Ciy of Detroit, 341 Mlch. 132, 67 '.W.2d Carpenter Lost right leg; left leg badly Injured.
93 (1954). 66 9.48 $3,300 56,350 41,000 41,000
42 .41tin v. Wilson, 6750. 20185 (Fta. 1953). 46 24+- Trainman Lost part f loot; both hands fractured; lost several teeth. 100,000 New tia
44 Port Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Glfford, 252 S.W.2d 204 Agscultural worker Lost left leg above knee; right loot completely reversed;
(Tex Cv. Apo. 1952). left shoulder dislocated. 77.044 72,044 72,044
5 ew'YorkCe v. Mtthiser, 231 Ind. 180, 106 Athlete and Lost leg; left eye will not focus; crushed arm; chest and head
N.E.2d 453 (1952). 39 Referee injuries. 50.000 50.000
46 St. Louis S.W. By. v. Ferguson, 182 F.2d 949 Switchman Lost left l lg 8" below hip; lost right arm above wrist lost all
(8th Cir. 1950). but thumb and forefinger on left hand. Could not use prosthesis. 150,000 150,000
47 Huggins V. Southern Pat. PLN., 92 CaL App. 2d 599, Lost left leg below knee and mot 0 right foot
207 P.2d 864 (lst Dist 1949). 12 54 91,000 91,000
32
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,i a T,, s 'o 361 Pa. iS Lost right leg below kmee, considerable loss of ower of
65.000 25.000 25.00062 A2d 84I fI41V 48 IF) left le.
a Wester o aiA. it.m V. suroeut, "j ua. App. a4u, . rgt .eg oeiow aeel 0 oroien rosz, puncture. :an COs-
54 S.E.2d 357 (1949). 50 2111 $10 per day lapsed lung; broken loft shoulder;, back Injury. 85,000 65.000
52 Be ley V. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518 
Lost right leg, 1/3 Of thigh remaining; loss of vison in right
(E.D.S.C. 1948). 10 48.1 eye-8.5, loft eye-4.3. 05,000
51 Eilolt v. zelasr, 19z Misc 3250, 80 N.y.S.ld 859 Lost loft leg; fractured hip.(Sup. Ct. 1948). 26 18.000 18.000
54 Edwards v. Penusylvanl lt.N, 72 F. Supp. 197 3.R. 
trackman Lost left leg above koee;, injured left arm.
(W.D. Pa. 1947). 45 20 $2,100 20,000 30,000
55 Malone v. SubUrban Transit Co., 64 F. Supp. 859 34 Lost loft leg; flesh torn Off buttocks; multiple fractures.
-,sC,1,6J------------- L 9 ttJ------------------------~o3.-------------------
Surburban Transit Co. v. Malone, 156 F. 2d 422
(4th Cir. 1946). 33,125
2 6 baer v. Great .Me., 119 Mon. 68, 170 P.2d Lost one leg; other foot badly infected.
768 (1946). 20,000 20,000
57 Henwood v. Chaney, 16 F.2d 292f8th Cir. 1946). SWItchnan Ight arm and leg "fell under cut of cars.' 67,000 87,__058 SaJues v. Le chj F.U. 000N.D. F I  948),,. 28 Mlechanic Lost leg a.nd par of hanud. 14,04,
Sanders v. Leech, 158 F.2d 486 (5th Cia. 1946). 14.643
59 Joice v. Missouri, H. a T. MRI., 214 Mo. 439, 189 Section foreman Lost right leg 6 1/2" from hip; broken arm; fractured ribs.
S.W.2d 568 (1945). 47 $2,000 80,000 65,000 50.000
60 s City So. Ity. v. Taylor, 209 z Ak 25, 190 tR. firema. Lost right leg 6" above knee; broken collar bone; other
S.W.2d 968 (1945). 33 38.53 $300 per month injuries. 40,600 40.000
61 Pittman v. Balul z, 304 S.W.Zd 601 (Tex. Cv. App. Agricultural Lost left arm at shoulder; fracurd skull. Cannot use pros-
. .- _ .19. . .. 24 43_-. wo.....--rker_- ------ hesn. ---- --------------........................-------....---------------------- -
Pittman v. Baladez, 312 S.W.2d 210 (Tea. Sup. CL Reversed on
1958). " other grounds
62 Firat v. Pennsylvanla X., 147 F. Supp. 765 Lost right forear: 3d, 4th & 5th digits of left hand broken
(S.D. N.Y. 1957). 24 47.49 nose other Injuries. 222,640 222.640
683 Lizerman v. Beho, 9 LL App. 2d 263, 132 .E.2d Lost right arm 3 1/2" from shoulder. Cannot use prosthesis.
788 (Ist DIst. 1956). 48 70,000 70,00084 la v. GreatN.Ry.,244 inn. 81,89 .W.ld Switchman Lost right arm 21/2" from shoulder. Cannot use prosthesis.
673 (1955). 20 38.80 $450 per month 170,155 105,000
bb PIerce v. UitdStates, 142 F. Supp. 721 Lineman Lost both arms between wrist and elbow; concussion, possible(E.D. Tenn. 1955). br _a3~.5~
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 985--- --
United States v. Pierce, 235 F.2d 466
(6th Cir. 1956). 53,985
66 DavIs v. Dep't o Highways, 68 So. 3d 283 Oilfield worker Lost left arm.
(La. App. 1953). 45 $200 per month 25,489 25,489
67 Tripp v. Watson, 235 b.W.2d 677 (TeM. Civ. Lost arm above elbow.
App. 1950). 15,000 15,000
68 Bennett v. Denver i N. G. W. kLA., 11 Utah 57, Brakeman Lost right arm just below shoulder.
213 P.2M 325 (1900). 26 38.12 $265 per month 70,000 70,000
69 Texas Pac.-lO. Pac. N.E. v. Welish, 179 F.d Switcman Lost arm.
880 (5th Cir. 1950). 48,000 48.000
70 Turrletta v. Wyche, 54 N.M. 5, 212 P.2d 1041 Mechanic Lost arm above elbow.
(1949). 15.000 15.000
71 vorwall Truck Line v. Kota, 120 ind: App. 383, Lost left arm at shoulder; concussion; other Injuries.
88 N.E.2d 799 (1949). 23 39+ 30.000 30.000
72 Tr-County e. Co-op. v. Clair, 217 S.W.2d Tree trimmer Lost arm below elbow; 15% impairment of other hand.
681 (Te=. Civ. App. 1949). 48 $47 per week 25.950 20,050
73 Reeves v. '1Tompson, 157 Mo. 847, 211 S.W. 2d Lost right arm at elbow;, injured back.
23 (1948). 27 5110 per month 22.500 15.000
74 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargeave, 10 F2 Lineman Lost right arm just below elbow; burned right leg.
405. 35 So. 3d I (1948). 43 25 $6,500 50.000 80,000
-75 Southern Ity. v. Pollen, 248 Ala. 665, 29 So. 2d Lost arm.
228 (1947). 55,000 40,000 40,009
76 Kircher v. Atchison, T. & 9. F. N.., 183 P.2d Aviation cadet Lost left hand. Reversedon
105 Ca.API 1947j. a. F3 60,100 183 F2de
Kircher v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 32 Cal. 2d
176, 195 P.2d 427 (1948) 60,000
77 Gibson County Elec. v. a 32 Tenn. App. 394, Farm laborer Lost right arn; burned loft hop, arm, and feet.
222 S.W.d 689 (1947). 59 $2.50 per day 10,000 10.000
78 Alpine TeL Corp. v. McCalU, 195 S.W.2d i85 Lost left arm above elbow, bone out of right leg (replaced).
(Te. Civ. App. 1946). 14 32500 32.500
79 Lueote v. Phfllpedes, 68 ZLE.2d 558 (o081 App. Lost left hand except thumb and forefinger.
1945). 33 60 per week 10,000 10,000
80 Gordon v. Muemling Packing Co., 328 Mo. "123, 40 laborer Loat right band at wrist
S.W. 2d 693 (1931). 41 $150 per month 25,000 21.000 27.000
81 Mi utLs v. The Archipelago, 159 F. Supp. 245 Seaman Lost part of right ring finger.(E.D. Va. 1958). 3.5008 .2 Joses V. laz, 21 Cone. Sopp. 28, 143 A.d 460 Lost ring finger at lst joint
(Super. CL 1958). 16 2,00 2,000
83 J.C. Penny Co. v. Livingston, 271 S.W.M 906 Lost index finger at 1st oat; fractured mddle finger.
(KI. App. 1954). 22 10,000 10.000
84 Jordan v. -=rsee! 256 S. W. App. 1953). (F) ot 2/3fflrtbone o t orf r. 00 150
85 G.L SurpiS V. Uenlro, 246 9.W.2d 293 (Tea. CV. Lost loft thumb.
App. 1952). 20,000 25.313 15.323
86 Railway Express Co. v. Real, 253 Ala 489, 45 So. Ry. postel clerk Lost right index finger at 2d joint.
2d 306 (1950). 4,500 3.000
87 Jaskols i v. Groves 84 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. PZ 1949). Seaman Lost 1/2 of dil phalanx of right index fInger. 774
88 Loughry v. Hodges, 21 b.W.d 689 (Tex. CiV. App. Lost end ofleft little finger.
1948). 4,000 4,000
89 W.E. Grace Mf . CO. v. Arp, 311 S.W.2d 278 Lost end of left index finger.
(Te. Clv. App. 1958). 33 5.035 5,035
90 Ktlmreu V. American Indem. Co., 56 So. 2d 880 Carpenter Lost loft little linger.
(La App. 3d Cir. 1952). 52 1,200 1,200
91 ileebt CO. v. Jacobsen, 180.2d 13 (D.D.C. 1950). 4 (F) Lost right little finger. 17O0 17,000,
92 Jstillan V. Versaggi, 169 F. Supp. 71 Seaman Lost lower 2/3 of Index and middle lingers; first 1/3 of ring
(S.D. Tex. 1954). 17 finger. 3,750
93 Colley v, State, 2 Misc. 2d 545, 152 N.Y.S.2d 968 -IPrsoner-welder Lost right third and fourth fingers; dist! phalanx of first
(Ct. CL 1950). 30 finger, middle phalanx of second finger. 6,000
94 J. GilsseL & Co. V. Smito, 24 S.W.2d 335 Seaman Lolt two fingers on right hand.
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952). 13,000 13,000
95 Cornett v. Hardy, 241 ,.w.2d 186 (TexCiv. App. Fill' gstation Lost it joint of thumb; all other fingers but one.
1951). 52 operator 20.000 20.000
96 Primus V. Bellevue Apts., 241 in. 1055, 44 .W.2d Lost right little and third flinger at base; second finger at
347 (1950). 18 1st joint 12.500 12.500
97 Jackson v. Yellow Cab Co., 360 P-a 635, 63 A.ld Lo 2/3 of phalanx of left middle figer injured index and
54 (1949). little fingers. 10,000 7,000
98 Hylak v. MLarcal, 335 ILL. App. 48, 80 N.E.ld 411 Lost ist two joints of right index and fourth lingers; 1st joint
(lst Dist. 1948). 15 (F) of third finMer. 15.000 15,000
99 Schilly v. Baker, 184 Tenn. 654, 202 S.W.2d 348 LOSt myddle, ring and index fingers.
(1947). 2,500 2.500
I00 Musgrave V. Kiftchen, 157 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. CL Lost right first and middle fingers; lcerations of head and
1956). 27 (F) face. 150,000 New trial
101 Rivera v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 61 N.1. 314, Lost all but left rig and little linger: lost all of skin on left
299 P.2d 1090 (1956). 15.77 5250 per month hand. 68.000 68.000
102 McCorstin v. Mdayfield, 274 S.W.ld 874 Carpenter Los most of lelt little finger;, burned face.
(Tex. Clv. App. 1955). 53 8,105 8,105
103 Boydston V. Tw addetl, 57 i.h1. 22, 253 P.2d 312 Lost right little finger at middle joint; multiple other injuries.
(1953). $25 per week 8,201 8,201
104 Schwenger v. (lotiner, 67 -zL App. 2d 913, 198 Lost tip of left middle finger; shortened left ring finger 1/2-;
P.2d 108 (1948). Injured left index finger. 5,000 5,000
105 Spicers, Inc. v. Rudd, 199 Okla. b76, 188 P.2d Student Lost one linger from left hand; 80f-90io loss of function of
692(1947). 18 right arm through fractures. 20.000 20.000
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